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Implications and Conclusions
survey filled out by 112 active Canadian chicken importers revealed that a large
majority (65.5 percent) of respondents are generally satisfied with the current TRQ
administration methods and do not feel that licence allocation mechanisms need to be
revised. A significant proportion (40.5 percent) of those who responded also wish to see
market access for foreign chicken products expanded above the current minimum access
commitment (MAC) of the TRQ. Market-based licence allocation methods (such as
auctions) are supported by only a few firms. Finally, firms operating in the province of
Quebec are significantly more satisfied with the current licence administration methods
than are firms operating in other provinces. Overall, the survey indicated that importers
generally wish to preserve the existing TRQ administration methods although they would
prefer to see market access to imports increase in future rounds of negotiations.
Background
rade of chicken products included on the Canadian Import Control List (ICL)
2 has
been regulated by a TRQ since 1995. TRQs are two-tier tariffs. Imports within the
minimum access commitment (equivalent to 7.5 percent of the previous year’s domestic
production) are taxed at a relatively low in-quota tariff (zero percent under NAFTA). Any
imports exceeding the specified minimum access commitment are taxed at the over-quota
tariff. TRQs theoretically differ from standard import quotas since they do not fix a
ceiling on the volume of imports that can enter the country. However, as the over-quota
tariff is generally set at a prohibitive level, TRQs de facto act as import quotas. Since the
world and domestic prices will differ if the minimum access commitment is effective
(binding), TRQs potentially create valuable rents to those holding the right to import
within the MAC.
The allocation of import licences under the Canadian chicken TRQ is administered
using mixed licensing allocation methods. In 2000, traditional importers held 37.2 percent
of all import licences. Traditional importers are defined as firms importing chicken
products prior to the imposition of import controls in 1979. This category encompasses
both chicken processors and retailers. The chicken TRQ is also allocated, in the first
instance, to further processors producing chicken products competing with non-controlled
imports (products not listed in the ICL, such as TV dinners, soup, etc.).
3 The final
allocation is made to members of the food-service sector. The amount allocated to the
food-service sector cannot be less than 2.5 million kilograms of import access. The
licences within each category are allocated to individual firms on the basis of market
share, calculated on the volume of chicken purchased. Any residual part of the TRQ not
previously allocated is split 70/30 between chicken processors and chicken distributors.
Figure 1 illustrates the economic implications of a TRQ for a given level of the
market, which is assumed to be competitive. Processors’ technology exhibits decreasing
A
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returns to scale as represented by the industry marginal cost curve,       MC0 . This curve can
be interpreted as the processors’ supply function if one assumes there is perfect
competition at that market level and the farm price is held constant throughout. The
segment    D represents the retail demand for processed chicken products.
Assume that the share of import licences under the MAC held by all processing firms
is       M0. Processors can import and resell chicken products directly to retailers.
4 Processing
firms have two options. They can process domestic chicken or import processed chicken
products. Hence, under the TRQ, the processors’ effective marginal cost curve is not
exclusively defined by the segment       MC0 . Since the world price augmented by the in-
quota tariff is below the intercept of the marginal cost curve, processors have an incentive
to import chicken products up to the quantity       M0. At that quantity, it is more profitable to
process chicken domestically than to import chicken products at the world price
augmented by the over-quota tariff 
  
p +
ov ( ). The bold lines in figure 1 represent the
effective marginal cost function for processors. The equilibrium occurs when this
effective marginal cost curve intersects the demand curve of retailers, yielding the
domestic retail price       p0 . What is the value that processors attach to an import licence?
Standard trade policy analysis usually defines import rents as the difference between the
world price and the domestic price, multiplied by the total volume of traded goods
(Vousden,1990). However, since processors’ domestic output is altered following an
Figure 1  The economic impacts of the Canadian Chicken TRQ.Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues D. Surprenant and J.-P. Gervais
                                                                                                                                             ￿ 65
increase in market access, the surplus derived from domestic production decreases. Define
the total net surplus collected by processors under the TRQ as the incremental surplus
obtained from holding import permits minus the decrease in domestic surplus. Total net
rents equal the difference between the area delimited by b, c, d, e, f and g and the area
delimited by    p +
ov, a, b and       p0  in figure 1. The net rents are more likely to be positive
the larger the difference between the world price and the marginal cost of producing the
first chicken product domestically.
Different import licensing administration procedures are likely to affect the effective
marginal cost function of processing firms in different ways. For example, compare two
opposing administration procedures such as first-come-first-served and a historical
allocation. The former method does not assign property rights to import licences. Each
marketing year, firms hurry to the border in order to import as many products as they can
under the MAC. Once the quota fills up, the over-quota tariff must be applied to
additional imports. Under that procedure, firms with low import-related transaction costs
have a competitive advantage over firms located far away from the border or lacking
established marketing channels with foreign firms. This type of procedure is likely to
create a race to the border if bureaucratic impediments to trade are insignificant
(Skully,1999). If import licences are allocated according to some historical criterion, firms
own the exclusive right to import a product at the in-quota tariff, and thus have the option
to import the product at any moment during the marketing year. Property rights to import
licences are unambiguously assigned and firms can spread their importing activities
throughout the year. Given that the industry depicted in figure 1 is perfectly competitive
and that processing firms are symmetric, different TRQ administration procedures will not
impact the distribution of income within the industry. However, Fulton and Tang (1999)
show that evidence exists of imperfect competition in the chicken industry. In that case,
the positioning of each firm’s effective marginal cost function as determined by, among
other things, the TRQ import licensing procedure is likely to have significant impacts on
the important variables of the industry (prices, production and import rents). Under that
condition, firms will not be indifferent towards various import licensing methods.
While the literature on non-tariff trade barriers is voluminous, relatively few studies
have documented the implications of allocating import licences under quantitative barriers
to trade. Krishna and Tan (1998) show that, independently of who has market power
among the potential licence holders and/or foreign/domestic producers, rents can be
extracted or dissipated through higher domestic and/or world prices. They show that the
(shadow) value of an import licence can be decomposed into three different components.
First, there exists a scarcity value attached to the licence in a quota-constrained market. It
is a function of the difference between the domestic price and the world price inclusive of
the in-quota tariff. Second, if the licence is voluntarily held, the licence price must vary in
proportion to the opportunity cost of holding the licence (e.g., the interest rate). Finally, aCurrent Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues D. Surprenant and J.-P. Gervais
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licence has an option value since it can be used at any time during the quota year; that is,
the holder of a licence can either import some units of the good now or defer use of the
licence until a future period in the expectation of higher quota-related returns. Gervais and
Surprenant (2000) have shown that the type of import licence allocation rule chosen by a
government can affect the distribution of profits in an industry by changing the strategic
nature of firms’ behaviour under imperfect competition.
Skully (1999) documented the existing TRQ allocation methods as notified by WTO
members. Roughly speaking, administration methods can be classified into two different
categories. The first category encompasses all non-discretionary methods such as
auctioning licences, allocating licences on a first-come-first-served basis and licensing on
demand. The second category includes more discretionary methods since trade flows are
often less flexible and do not respond to exogenous market forces. This category includes
licences allocated according to historical criteria and imports administered by state trading
enterprises or producer groups. Barichello (2000) surveyed import licence allocation
procedures used in Canada and concluded that Canada is “reasonably successful” at
keeping the administration of the quota system efficient.
It is well known that non-tariff trade barriers promote rent-seeking behaviour among
potential beneficiaries of import licences (Vousden,1990). The import licence allocation
schemes described above, combined with the potential existence of market power at the
farm level (through the control of domestic production of live chickens) and concentration
at the processing and retail levels of the chicken market, justify investigating the
preferences of importing firms.
5 The allocation of import licences to domestic firms
affects their marginal costs and has the potential to generate significant rents. The
magnitude of these rents can be influenced by the method policy makers choose to
allocate the right to import. Given that a wide variety of methods can be used to allocate
import licences, how do importers perceive the Canadian TRQ policy and import
licensing administration methods? To analyze this general question, a number of
hypotheses based on the preceding discussion and the simple analysis in figure 1 can be
put forward:
1. Some import licence holders should support an allocation based on historical
criteria because this approach can best protect existing import rents. Newly
established or highly efficient firms may wish to have the current system
reformed since change could result in new profit opportunities.
2. Importers have different opinions about how the government should
liberalize trade (if at all) in the Canadian chicken market because increases in
the current minimum access commitment and/or decreases in the over-quota
tariff potentially will have different impacts on profits (rents) for different
types of importers.Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues D. Surprenant and J.-P. Gervais
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3. Since import licences are currently allocated to processors and retailers, an
importer’s position in the chicken supply chain should influence the value it
attaches to an import permit (loosely defined as the difference between the
local price and the import price) and thus shape its perceptions towards the
current allocation system.
4. Finally, preferences towards licence allocation methods can vary across
regions due to differences in efficiency and/or concentration at the
processing level or due to different market conditions (price-elasticity of
demand, etc.).
Data and Methodology
total of 497 importers located across Canada were sent survey questionnaires during
the last quarter of 2000. The objective of the survey was to evaluate their opinions
towards Canadian chicken trade policy, especially as it relates to the administration of the
TRQ. The 497 importers who were sent questionnaires had each obtained at least one
import licence from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in 2000.
The questionnaire included 11 questions and was written in both official languages of
Canada. Importers whose businesses were located in Quebec received the French
questionnaire while other importers received the English questionnaire. Importers were
also presented with the alternative of requesting the survey in the language of their choice.
Eleven questionnaires were returned with notification that the importing firms’ addresses
were incorrect. A total of 112 importers returned usable questionnaires, yielding a
participation rate for the survey of 23.1 percent. Included with the questionnaire were a
cover letter explaining the purpose of the study and a short introductory statement about
the WTO trade negotiations and existing import licensing allocation methods as notified
by WTO members. A reminder was sent to all importing firms two weeks after the initial
date.
Statistical Analysis
he first part of the analysis uses univariate statistics to describe the most important
findings. In the second stage of analysis, the survey answers are compared
quantitatively using Chi-square tests to determine if the survey answers to any set of two
questions are independent of each other.
6
The first question in the survey ascertains the categories under which each sampled
firm requested an import licence for chicken products for the year 2000. Out of the 112
usable observations for this question, 39.1 percent of the respondents reported that they
had requested licences under the allocation for processing firms, 50.9 percent were
distributors or food-service establishments and 10 percent had requested import licences
under the allocation reserved for traditional importers. Of the 112 respondents,
A
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36.6 percent were from the province of Quebec while the remaining firms operated in
other Canadian provinces. The sample is representative of the geographic concentration of
the industry since, of all importers listed with Foreign Affairs and International Trade,
40.4 percent are located in Quebec.
The upcoming round of negotiations in agriculture will surely encompass a broad
agenda of topics in agri-food trade. A number of TRQ liberalization scenarios will likely
be discussed. The second question in the survey was designed to evaluate importers’
qualitative judgments of Canadian import policy in the chicken industry. Importers were
asked which type of import policy they would support in comparison with the current
trade system. Figure 2 shows the preferences of Canadian chicken importers relative to
various TRQ liberalization scenarios. Of the importers surveyed, 40.5 percent wish to
have the minimum access commitment (MAC) expanded above the current negotiated
access of 7.5 percent of the previous year’s domestic production. A significant proportion
of importers (25.2 percent) support the status quo in terms of access. Alternatively,
8.1 percent of the importers would like Canadian negotiators to argue for a more
protectionist position. Liberalization through a simultaneous reduction in the over-quota
tariff and an increase in the MAC is supported by 9.9 percent of the importers. Simply
reducing over-quota tariffs to stimulate trade liberalization is supported by a meagre
2.7 percent of the importers surveyed. Some firms (13.6 percent) think that market access
negotiations should be undertaken through other means.
The next section of the survey directly addresses the administration procedures of the
TRQ. Figure 3 shows that a large portion of the importers surveyed (46.4 percent) prefer
preserving the current allocation scheme. An administration method strictly based upon
historical market shares is the next preferred alternative of importers. A licence-on-
demand type of allocation receives 17 percent of all support. Non-discretionary types of




























Figure 2  Importers’ preferences towards TRQ liberalization scenarios in the Canadian
chicken industry.Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues D. Surprenant and J.-P. Gervais
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3.6 percent and 1.8 percent respectively. Finally, 1.8 percent of importers wish to have the
licences administered by chicken producers’ organizations. A centralized import control
by a state trading agency is an alternative that is totally rejected by importers.
A further set of questions measures the importers’ perceptions towards the current
TRQ administration procedures. More than 65 percent are either very satisfied or satisfied
with the current Canadian chicken import system (see figure 4). Responses to another
question indicated that a majority of importers (51.8 percent) believed that the current
system did not facilitate entry by new importing firms into the market for import licences.
Regarding the clarity of the Canadian chicken import licensing procedures, a vast majority
of importers (80.8 percent) consider them to be clear, very clear or extremely clear (see
figure 5).
As argued earlier, quantitative trade restrictions create rents for import licence
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Figure 4  Importers’ satisfaction with the current Canadian TRQ for chicken products.Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues D. Surprenant and J.-P. Gervais
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import prices and domestic market conditions. Moreover, importers likely specialize in a
variety of products for which quality attributes result in different quota rents. Therefore, a
large variation should be expected in estimates of the TRQ rent. More than 29 percent of
importers estimate that the rent associated with current import restrictions in the Canadian
chicken industry is above $0.50/kg. Approximately one-quarter (24.1 percent) of
importers estimate the rent to be within the interval of $0.25/kg and $0.50/kg, while
11.1 percent and 9.3 percent of respondents estimate it to be within the intervals of
$0.10/kg to $0.25/kg and $0.01/kg to $0.10/kg, respectively.
It should be noted that more than one-quarter of the respondents declined to answer
the specific question dealing with rent estimates; this suggests that rent evaluation is a
delicate matter. Using publicly available data, Huff, Meilke and Amedei (2000) computed
the quota rents of Canadian chicken importers from 1995 to 1999. They found that the
average quota rents over the period were $0.52/kg. Focusing on the 1999 period yields a
lower import quota rent of $0.34/kg. These results are fairly well aligned with the
importers’ perceptions reported in the survey.
In the second stage of analysis, pairs of questions in the survey are analyzed to gain
further insights about the preferences of Canadian importers. Preferences towards
liberalization scenarios are grouped under two variables. The first category includes the
importers who reported supporting a more protectionist system than the one currently in
place or wishing to preserve the TRQ in its current form. The second category includes
importers wanting a more liberalized trading environment in the Canadian chicken
industry. Moreover, the various allocation methods are grouped based on the degree of
discretion they entail. The first group, termed non-discretionary methods, includes
licences allocated according to the first-come-first-served condition, licences allocated on
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Figure 5  Importers’ perceptions of the clarity of the administrtive import licensing
procedures of the current Canadian TRQ for chicken products.Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues D. Surprenant and J.-P. Gervais
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based upon historical market shares and licences administered by producers’ groups. The
intent is to test the hypothesis that firms requesting greater market access to foreign
chicken products would support market-based licence allocation methods in a greater
proportion than firms demanding more protection than what is currently in place. Among
importers who support more protectionist policies, 88.9 percent desire to have the import
licence allocation made according to some discretionary method. Of those importers who
prefer a more liberalized environment, 55.3 percent wish to have the government adopt
less discretionary administration methods to allocate import licences. These differences of
opinion are statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level.
It is also interesting to investigate the preferences of importers based on their
geographical locations. Importing firms located in Quebec tend to be more protectionist
than importers located elsewhere in the country; 85.4 percent of those in Quebec support a
protectionist policy while support for a protectionist policy falls to 52.1 percent among
firms located elsewhere. Moreover, there exists a significant difference between
importers’ preferred licence administration procedures, depending on the location of their
business. Of the importers located in Quebec, 89.7 percent prefer the licence
administration methods classified as discretionary while 70.4 percent of importers located
in other provinces prefer discretionary methods. This difference is significant at the
95 percent confidence level. The degree of overall satisfaction with the current TRQ
system also differs significantly between importing firms in Quebec and importers located
elsewhere. Importing firms located in Quebec are clearly satisfied with the current
administration method in a larger proportion than firms located elsewhere (87.5 percent
relative to 52.9 percent).
Surprisingly, no statistically significant relationships between the category of
importing firm and the reported answers to the questionnaire were identified. This is
rather surprising since import licence allocation shares differ according to the firms’
sectors of activity. The rents captured by each importing firm should differ across their
sector of operations because their valuation of import permits is directly a function of the
difference between the domestic price and the world price. Moreover, different TRQ
administration procedures can affect the market levels of the industry in different ways
depending on the degree of discretion associated with the procedures. This could have led
to important differences in the rents importers obtain from the TRQ system. These
surmises could not be validated by the survey.
7
Concluding Remarks
This paper evaluated Canadian chicken importers’ preferences towards TRQ import
licensing mechanisms. Are there any lessons from the analysis of the survey that can
inform attempts to reform the TRQ administration procedures at the WTO? Any
quantitative trade restriction is likely to bring forward divergent private interests in anCurrent Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues D. Surprenant and J.-P. Gervais
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industry. Non-competitive markets will likely produce even more divergent interests
across all types of agents in the industry. The focus of the present study was to analyze
TRQ administration procedures from the perspective of importers. Canadian firms were
found to have substantially different vested interests with regards to Canadian import
policy for chicken. TRQ allocation procedures have important welfare effects
domestically and research must begin to address the domestic income distribution
implications of import licence allocation mechanisms. WTO negotiators should not focus
exclusively on analyzing the effects of TRQ administration procedures on the exporting
side of the market when addressing TRQ reforms. While such a focus represents a
legitimate and important issue, negotiators should not underestimate the impacts that TRQ
allocation reforms would have on domestic firms. If negotiators fail to consider domestic
issues, domestic lobbies can become important obstacles to TRQ reforms during the next
round of multilateral negotiations on agricultural trade. In Canada, a majority of firms
want to preserve the status quo in terms of import licence allocation procedures, but
specific opinions regarding the TRQ administration procedures vary significantly across
geographical regions. The government may be well advised to promote minor reforms to
its current allocation system and increased market access to foreign chicken products if it
does not want to attract negative feedback from the chicken importers’ lobby. Of course,
the ultimate political goal will be to find the right balance between the interests of
producers, importers and consumers.Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues D. Surprenant and J.-P. Gervais
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Endnotes
1 The authors wish to thank Robert Saint-Louis, Robert Romain, two anonymous referees,
and an associate editor for providing helpful comments on an earlier draft of the paper.
The usual caveat about remaining errors applies. The authors gratefully acknowledge the
financial support of Agriculture and Agri-food Canada (AAFC). The opinions expressed
by the authors do not necessarily reflect those of AAFC. Senior authorship is shared
equally between the two authors.
2 Chicken products on the ICL include live chickens (all weights), eviscerated (whole or
cut-up) chicken (fresh, chilled, and frozen), eviscerated, cooked or processed chicken, and
(eviscerated) smoked or dried chicken products.
3 These imported chicken products are used as inputs in the production of chicken meals
and can be counted in the TRQ. The objective of this allocation procedure is to increase
the competitiveness of further processors in marketing chicken products not included in
the ICL. However, during the period 1995 to 2000, special import permits were delivered
to importers producing chicken products not on the ICL and were not taxed at the over-
quota tariff and not counted in the TRQ. This explains why the actual quantity ofCurrent Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues D. Surprenant and J.-P. Gervais
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imported chicken products exceeded the minimum access of the TRQ from 1996 to 2000
(Statistics Canada, 2001) despite over-quota tariffs on chicken imports well in excess of
200 percent.
4 We omit, for simplicity, any potential processing costs related to import goods. This
omission does not alter the main arguments of the analysis.
5 Information obtained from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade of
Canada confirmed that the ten largest importers of chicken products in Canada held
42 percent of the global number of licences available under the TRQ, suggesting that there
is a certain concentration in the import licence market. A recent study by Agriculture and
Agri-food Canada (1999) revealed also that processing activities in Canada are fairly
concentrated. The five largest companies in terms of volume were processing 59 percent
of all chicken slaughters while the ten largest firms were processing 81 percent of all
Canadian chicken slaughters. Moreover, Fulton and Tang (1999) found significant
departure from competitive behavior in the Canadian chicken industry over the period
1965 to 1996.
6 Consult Freund (1992) for further details on the statistical procedure.
7  It should be noted that, although the statistical evidence is inconclusive, the survey
results do not imply that the different types of firms have similar preferences towards the
TRQ allocation procedures.